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THE IMPENDING COLLISION OF SMART
CONTRACTS AND THE AU TOMATIC STAY
Carter D. Wietecha*
INTRODUCTION
A standard contract, though often complex in practice, is
theoretically simple. At least two parties agree to an exchange, and
they memorialize that agreement through a spoken or written
promise.1 The parties make commitments with the background
knowledge that courts—or another third party empowered to make
binding decisions—stand ready to interpret and enforce these
commitments in the event of a dispute. This has been the
paradigmatic functioning of contracts for centuries and, until
recently, its basic premises were unavoidable. Rational actors have
always had reasons to fear that the other parties to an agreement
might not live up to their promises.2 This demands an enforcement
mechanism that goes beyond a mere trusting relationship; without it,
actors are far less likely to put their faith in contracts.3 However, the
advent of high-tech computer processing now provides the tools to
challenge the underlying assumptions of contract formation and
execution. Digital code offers an alternative to the spoken or written
word. And, in place of a third-party enforcer, blockchain technology
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School 2022; Bachelor of Arts in
History and Political Science, Northwestern University, 2018. I would like to sincerely
thank Professor Daniel Murray for his diligent instruction, Judge Eugene Wedoff for his
thoughtful revisions, and Riley Sykes for her patience, feedback, and constant support.
Additional thanks to the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their time and
attention. All opinions expressed herein, as well as any remaining errors, are entirely my
own and not attributable to those who assisted in revisions.
1 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 71 (AM. L. INST. 1981) (establishing that,
at its core, contract law revolves around a bargained-for “performance or a return
promise”).
2 See Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305,
306 (2017) (describing how a contract involving “human discretion” cannot be thought of
as automated).
3 See id. at 310 (highlighting the importance of third-party enforcement and
identifying traditional means of enforcement as “institutions like arbitration or courts of
law”).
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stands ready to hold actors accountable.4 Touted as the first trustworthy system for electronic contract enforcement, blockchain
technology has the potential to transform the shape and function of
covenants.5 But the law in the United States is still built around
longstanding limitations on enforcing contracts. One, especially
limiting, is bankruptcy law.
A key goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to give the debtor a chance
to breathe and take stock of its situation, free of creditors’ collection
activity.6 The automatic stay advances that goal by preventing
creditors from making a “run” on the debtor’s estate and rapidly
depleting it to the detriment of the debtor and other creditors.7 If a
debtor is going to be successfully rehabilitated, it must have the
opportunity to construct a plan of reorganization in an environment
of relative peace. However, the structure of the automatic stay relies
on certain basic assumptions about the business and legal environment. Primarily, the automatic stay rules appear to be based upon an
assumption that a human actor—such as a judge or a creditor—is
required to enforce contested contracts, legal judgments, and the
like. The need for human enforcement allows the Bankruptcy Code,
through the automatic stay, to block such efforts and pause them
until the resolution of the bankruptcy. But recent changes in
technology now allow for contracts that execute automatically,
permanently, and without the aid of enforcement efforts of a court or
creditor. These so-called “smart contracts” therefore evade the basic
assumptions around which the automatic stay is built. Yet, despite
their novelty, smart contracts still have the potential to willfully
violate the automatic stay.
This Note begins by briefly examining the nature and function
of smart contracts, including how they have changed over time.

4 See id. (arguing that smart contracts, which “do[] not rely on the state for
enforcement,” are still able to ensure performance).
5 See What Are Smart Contracts on Blockchain?, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/topics
/smart-contracts [https://perma.cc/F9VC-K24C] (identifying the potential benefits of
blockchain-based contracts, including additional reliability, increased security, and
decreased transaction costs).
6 See City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 589 (2021) (“The automatic stay
serves the debtor’s interests by protecting the estate from dismemberment, and it also
benefits creditors as a group by preventing individual creditors from pursuing their own
interests to the detriment of the others.”).
7 See In re Aleris Int’l, Inc., 456 B.R. 35, 46 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (“The automatic
stay is intended ‘to prevent certain creditors from gaining a preference for their claims
against the debtor; to forestall the depletion of the debtor’s assets due to legal costs in
defending proceedings against it; and, in general, to avoid interference with the orderly
liquidation or rehabilitation of the debtor.’” (quoting Borman v. Raymark Indus., Inc.,
946 F.2d 1031, 1036 (3d Cir. 1991))).
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Next, it evaluates the relevant language of Code provisions dealing
with the automatic stay and discusses decisions treating the
interaction of early generation smart contracts with the automatic
stay. It concludes with a discussion of how the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in City of Chicago v. Fulton8 has significantly changed
the legal landscape for smart contracts and how the automatic stay
will likely interact with smart contracts in the near future.
I.

UNDERSTANDING SMART CONTRACTS
A. Early Generation Smart Contracts

Smart contracts, at least in their most primitive form, are
ubiquitous. Everyday soda or snack dispensing machines technically
involve smart contracts.9 In those basic transactions, the consumer
deposits money into the machine, the machine validates information
about the payment and, if certain security criteria are satisfied, it
automatically dispenses a product.10 No third-party human actor is
required to consummate these basic purchases, and the transaction
can be final and automatic. Therefore, at their core, smart contracts
involve “‘a set of promises, specified in digital form, including
protocols within which the parties perform on these promises.’
Smart contracts self-execute upon the triggering of pre-determined
conditions.”11 As the soda dispensing machine example demonstrates, smart contracts need not be excessively complicated. And, for
much of the last twenty years, they were not. Some of the most
common “first-generation” smart contracts include companies
automatically locking a consumer’s phone or vehicle in the event of
bill nonpayment.12 For years, shoppers have also benefitted from eBay’s “bid-up” program, which is a tool programmed to “auto-bid on
an item, up to a certain price, with certain parameters involving

8 141 S. Ct. 585.
9 Raskin, supra note 2, at 306 (identifying a soda dispensing machine as a means of
engaging with primitive smart contracts).
10 Danielle D’Onfro, Smart Contracts and the Illusion of Automated Enforcement, 61
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 173, 174 (2020).
11 Morgan N. Temte, Comment, Blockchain Challenges Traditional Contract Law: Just
How Smart Are Smart Contracts?, 19 WYO. L. REV. 87, 94 (2019) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J 313, 319 (2017)).
12 See id. at 95. The automatic nature of the lockup is what distinguishes a smart
contract execution from ordinary self-help. See George Lawton, Definition: Smart Contract,
TECHTARGET,
https://searchcompliance.techtarget.com/definition/smart-contract
[https://perma.cc/3HB4-NWVB] (June 2021) (“Smart contracts are performed
automatically by the network and reduce the need for a third party to manage
transactions between businesses.”).
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speed of bid and time interval between bids.”13 Once the consumer
sets his or her preferences, the code has authority to enter into
legally binding purchase agreements without further review.14
Accordingly, smart contracts are relatively commonplace.
Still, two interrelated issues have historically hampered the range
of uses for first-generation smart contracts. First, sophisticated users
were—justifiably—concerned that the contract drafter could not be
entirely trusted. In the world of traditional contracts, attorneys are
trained to identify risks and pitfalls in how a contract is worded.15
Understanding the terms of a contract becomes much more difficult
when they are translated into code, especially when all parties
involved might not completely understand the technology. In part
because of this uncertainty, first-generation smart contracts did not
have a strong presence in high-value commerce.16 Second, firstgeneration smart contracts suffered from difficulties with verification
of real-world events.17
To be entirely self-executing, a smart
contract’s code must identify when a triggering condition has
occurred. This is easy to program when a machine only needs to
identify how much money a customer deposited before dispensing a
bag of chips. But any complexity beyond a basic transfer requires a
complicated system of input processing. For example, how can a
program reliably determine that a condition subsequent has been
met for a property reversion? Such programming requires sophisticated computing of the type that has only recently come into
existence. The invention of blockchain technology has largely put
both of these concerns to rest.
B. Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts
“Second-generation” smart contracts differ from the first
generation because they leverage blockchain technology. The
central contributions of blockchain technology are its accuracy and
trustworthiness.18 Blockchain “is a type of distributed ledger that

13 Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35, 45 (2014) (discussing eBay as one of the first proponents of
consumer-friendly automated contracting tools).
14 See id.
15 See Alan Rosenberg, Automatic Contracts and the Automatic Stay: A Primer on “Smart
Contracts” in Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July 2019, at 18, 18 (discussing the
importance of skilled professionals in the context of contract formation).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. (highlighting how blockchain is “effectively tamper-proof” and protects users
from the possibility of unilateral change (quoting Scott A. McKinney, Rachel Landy &

2022]

COLLISION OF SMART CONTRACTS AND THE AUTOMATIC STAY

1355

records transactions.”19 There is no master copy of the ledger, as
“any participant may maintain a copy of the ledger and yet all
participants have confidence that their[] [ledger] matches all other
copies.”20 At a high level, all blockchain technology contains four
components: “(i) a ledger, (ii) a network, and (iii) consensus, that is
(iv) unalterable by feasible means.”21
Apart from a general
understanding of its functioning, the details behind blockchain
networks are not strictly relevant for this discussion. Instead, the
consequences of blockchain technology on contract execution are
what matter most.
When paired with much stronger modern computers,
blockchain allows for highly reliable, highly complex, automatic, selfexecuting contracts.22
Blockchain technology is revolutionary
because it is the first innovation that allows for trustworthy contract
enforcement without traditional third-party recourse.23 Unlike a firstgeneration smart contract, an initiated blockchain-based smart
contract cannot be altered or disabled.24 So, the parties can program the
contract at the outset to have no safety hatch; this endows both
parties with the rigid certainty in execution that they seek.25 The
parties to the agreement can have complete confidence that the
contract will execute exactly as planned once the triggering
conditions are met.26 And yet, blockchain contracts cannot simply
divorce themselves from the operation of generally applicable law.
This intersection, where the automatic and unalterable function of
smart contracts runs into the demands of law, has the most potential
for issues. One of the most glaring points of contention is
bankruptcy law’s automatic stay.
Fully autonomous second-generation smart contracts put the
contracting parties at risk of willfully violating the automatic stay.
Rachel Wilka, Smart Contracts, Blockchain, and the Next Frontier of Transactional Law, 13
WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 313, 317 (2018))).
19 Heather Hughes, Blockchain and the Future of Secured Transactions Law, 3 STAN. J.
BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 21, 28–29 (2020).
20 Id. at 29.
21 Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
22 See Raskin, supra note 2, at 308 (arguing that blockchain allows for the first secure
contract enforcement that need not make use of the state’s authority).
23 Id.
24 Hughes, supra note 19, at 31 (“No one can alter a transaction once it is approved,
because the blocks are linked in a sequence that cannot be feasibly altered.”).
25 Id. at 35 (“[E]nforcement [of a blockchain smart contract] is unavoidable and
happens without reference to a court or external authority.” (emphasis added)).
26 As is discussed later in the Note, the nature of the triggering conditions depends
on how the contract is drafted and how the smart contract is coded. It is therefore
possible that a highly sophisticated smart contract could build in conditions that are
sensitive to bankruptcy events.
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This is because the second-generation smart contract’s greatest
feature—its tamper-proof execution—pairs poorly with the automatic
stay. For example, consider a second-generation smart contract
involving a lease agreement for an expensive and critical piece of
machinery.27 The lessee corporation happens upon hard times and
defaults on its payments to the lessor. Instantly, the smart contract
would gather the necessary data to “understand” that the lessee has
not met its side of the agreement. The smart contract’s interface
would connect to both of the parties’ banking information and
identify the lessee default. Under the present model, this could
unavoidably trigger a set of consequences, including disabling the
machine and immediately transferring legal ownership back to the
lessor.
Of course, the contract’s original programming could require
human intervention before execution.28 And a human intervention
requirement would help avoid issues with the automatic stay.
However, such a change would fundamentally undermine vital
features of second-generation smart contracts—their uncompromising objectivity, certainty, and predictability in enforcement.
Therefore, even if the hypothetical lessee had filed for bankruptcy
prior to the default and notified the lessor, the parties might have no
way to stop the impending equipment shut down. In the context of a
fully empowered second-generation smart contract “[t]here is no
longer the intervention point at which a bankruptcy trustee can assess
whether the equipment is property of the lessor or is property of the
debtor subject to a lien.”29 This type of hypothetical scenario
indicates the threat of smart contracts to the automatic stay.
The Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of the automatic stay
in City of Chicago v. Fulton30 indicates that the permissibility of secondgeneration smart contract execution probably depends on context.
Where a second-generation contract executes pre-petition, a violation
of the automatic stay is highly unlikely. However, a secondgeneration contract executing on a post-petition debtor will probably
violate the automatic stay.

27 See Hughes, supra note 19, at 24 (providing the core facts of the machinery
hypothetical discussed in the text).
28 See Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 19 (indicating that a blockchain contract could
have certain safety valves where a human user must enter a permission key before contract
execution). Note, however, that such safety valves largely deprive the second-generation
smart contract of its key feature: perfectly reliable execution.
29 Hughes, supra note 19, at 24.
30 City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 589–91 (2021).
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THE PROTECTIONS OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY

Before analyzing the interaction between smart contracts and
the automatic stay, it is useful to examine the relevant Code
provisions. Functioning as a cornerstone of the Bankruptcy Code, 11
U.S.C. § 362(a) defines the automatic stay. Specifically, § 362(a)(3)
provides that the mere filing of a bankruptcy petition prohibits “any
act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the
estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.”31 The policy of
the automatic stay is to be expansive in its coverage,32 and the
wording of § 362(a) supplies exactly that type of reach. Any creditor
action to obtain possession or exercise control over the debtor’s
property potentially violates the automatic stay. Section 362(k)(1)
additionally provides a strong punishment for any creditor who
willfully disobeys the demands of the automatic stay: “[A]n individual
injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall
recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in
appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”33
Though courts differ slightly, there is general consensus around what
a debtor must show to recover under Section 362(k):
[T]o recover for a willful violation of stay, debtors must prove the
following: (1) that a bankruptcy petition was filed, (2) that the
debtors are “individuals” under the automatic stay provisions, (3)
that creditors received notice of the petition, (4) that the
creditors’ actions were in willful violation of the stay, and (5) that
the debtor suffered damages.34

For the willfulness prong, bankruptcy courts generally agree that a
violation is willful when the defendant “(1) knew the automatic stay
was invoked and (2) intended the actions which violated the stay.”35
Therefore, a violator need not specifically intend to violate the

31 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2018) (emphasis added).
32 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 54–55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5840–41,
1978 WL 8531 (“The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections
provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his
creditors.”); see also In re Shickles, 612 B.R. 444, 449 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2019) (“[T]he
automatic stay ‘is designed to give the debtor “a breathing spell from his creditors. It
stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions.”’” (quoting Ellison
v. Nw. Eng’g Co., 707 F.2d 1310, 1311 (11th Cir. 1983))).
33 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1).
34 Grisard-Van Roey v. Auto Credit Ctr., Inc. (In re Grisard-Van Roey), 373 B.R. 441,
444 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007) (citing In re Sammon, 253 B.R. 672, 680 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2000)).
35 Gordon v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (In re Wilson), 454 B.R. 546, 551 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 2011) (quoting Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Eng’g, Inc.), 92 F.3d 1539, 1555
(11th Cir. 1996)).
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automatic stay.36 The violator need only intend the actions which
ultimately violate the automatic stay.37 Considering the underlying
Bankruptcy Code, the automatic stay provides widespread and robust
protection. Still, two additional components of § 362 broaden the
stay’s reach.
First, the Code references the debtor’s “property,” which is
specifically defined later in the Code. Section 541(a)(1) states that
property includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
property as of the commencement of the case.”38 This broad
definition has the potential to cover a wide variety of smart contract
transactions; any smart contract that implicates the debtor’s legal or
equitable interests could potentially fall within the purview of the
automatic stay.
Second, the Code establishes that the automatic stay protects the
debtor from an actor obtaining possession or exercising control over that
property.
Bankruptcy courts generally define the obtaining
possession element using its plain meaning. For instance, postpetition “repossession of a debtor’s automobile is an obvious
violation of § 362(a)(3).”39 Other bankruptcy courts have compared
“obtaining possession” to “an act designed to change control of
property.”40 Accordingly, both the Code and many bankruptcy courts
set a low bar for what constitutes “obtaining possession” of a debtor’s
estate post-petition; any act to transfer ownership of estate property
likely qualifies. Therefore, this first prong sets the stage for a possible
collision with a smart contract’s key feature—automatic and
computerized enforcement.
Court interpretation of the “exercising control” prong requires
more detailed analysis. Bankruptcy, district, and circuit courts
generally split their interpretation of exercising control into two
contexts. The first context deals with exercises of control that occur
post-petition.
In that situation, courts typically interpret the
“exercising control” text as simply bolstering the “obtaining
possession” protections.41 This broad definition thus provides a wide
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2018).
39 Allentown Ambassadors, Inc. v. Ne. Am. Baseball, LLC (In re Allentown
Ambassadors, Inc.), 361 B.R. 422, 437 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007).
40 In re Hall, 502 B.R. 650, 665 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Beker Indus. Corp. v.
Fla. Land and Water Adjudicatory Comm’n (In re Beker Indus. Corp.), 57 B.R. 611, 626
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)). As is mentioned in Part IV, this definition would appear to
include disabling the operation of a debtor’s property.
41 Id. (finding that “exercising control” simply allows for post-petition protection of
intangible estate rights that would be inconducive to “real possession” (quoting 1 DAVID
G. EPSTEIN, STEVE H. NICKLES & JAMES J WHITE, BANKRUPTCY § 3-14, at 163 (1992))). If
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range of debtor protection post-petition, and it functions in tandem
with the obtaining possession language.42 Therefore, in the postpetition context, the Code text tightly restricts creditor action against
the debtor. One bankruptcy court went as far as stating that the
automatic stay prevents “‘virtually all formal and informal [postpetition] actions’ against estate property.”43
The question of exercising control was previously more
uncertain within the second context: pre-petition action. Before the
Court’s Fulton opinion,44 the circuits disagreed on whether the
protection against “exercising control” required an affirmative
relinquishment of property obtained pre-petition.45 That question fell
in the gap between obtaining possession and exercising control. A
creditor who took control of defaulted debtor property pre-petition
did not “obtain[] possession” of that property during the
bankruptcy.46 Yet, at least some circuits previously recognized such
conduct as impermissibly “exercising control” over debtor property.47
The simplest example of this disparity involves a vehicle repossession.
If the creditor repossessed the vehicle post-petition, then the creditor
certainly exercised control as well as obtained possession of property
that belongs to the debtor’s estate. But if the repossession occurred
pre-petition, the courts disagreed on whether the creditor needed to
affirmatively return the vehicle to the debtor in order to avoid
“exercising control.”48
the “obtaining possession” language does not cover disabling property in the debtor’s
possession, then the “exercising control” would cover such conduct. This statutory
coverage is relevant for issues analyzed in Part IV.
42 Id. (asserting that the exercising control language merely tightened the
protections of Section 362).
43 Lowe v. Ransier (In re Nicole Gas Prod., Ltd.), 581 B.R. 843, 853 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.
2018) (quoting Smith v. First Am. Bank, N.A. (In re Smith), 876 F.2d 524, 525–26 (6th Cir.
1989)), aff’d 916 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2019).
44 City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021).
45 Circuit cases holding that retention of debtor property violates § 362(a)(3):
Thompson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009); Weber v. SEFCU
(In re Weber), 719 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013); Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rozier (In re Rozier), 376
F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2004); California Employment Development Department v. Taxel (In re Del
Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1996); and Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re
Knaus), 889 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1989). Circuit cases holding that retention of debtor
property does not violate § 362(a)(3): In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2019);
and WD Equipment, LLC v. Cowen (In re Cowen), 849 F.3d 943 (10th Cir. 2017).
46 Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702.
47 See id.; In re Weber, 719 F.3d at 79; In re Rozier, 376 F.3d at 1324; In re Del Mission
Ltd., 98 F.3d at 1152; In re Knaus, 889 F.2d at 775.
48 Circuit cases holding that the creditor needed to affirmatively return the vehicle
to avoid violating § 362(a)(3): Thompson, 566 F.3d at 708; In re Weber, 719 F.3d at 81; In re
Rozier, 376 F.3d at 1324; In re Del Mission, 98 F.3d at 1151; In re Knaus, 889 F.2d at 775.
Circuit cases holding that the creditor has no duty to affirmatively return pre-petition
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This factual situation came before the Supreme Court in
Fulton.49 As is discussed in detail in Part IV, the Court determined
that a creditor who took custody of debtor property pre-petition,
(e.g., by towing and impounding the debtor’s vehicle), may continue
to passively hold it without violating § 362(a)(3). In so holding, the
Court likely cleared the way for second-generation smart contracts to
affect debtor property in the pre-petition environment without violating the automatic stay protections. However, the Court’s language
from the same opinion indicates that second-generation contracts are
possibly on a collision course with the automatic stay when they
execute post-petition.
III.

SMART CONTRACTS AND VIOLATIONS OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY

The purpose of this Part is to evaluate how second-generation
smart contracts will likely engage with the automatic stay provisions.
Though Fulton provides a new wave of guidance on this topic,50
second-generation contracts have never been directly evaluated by
any court. Indeed, one of the most difficult aspects of secondgeneration smart contracts is their novelty; blockchain technology
has made major strides in the last five years, but it is still quite new.51
Bankruptcy courts have not yet addressed whether the unfettered
operation of blockchain smart contracts may give rise to violations of
the automatic stay, and the Fulton decision is recent as well.52 This
lack of litigation means that caselaw directly on point is nonexistent.
Still, two areas of the law provide some insight to the question of
smart contracts. First, bankruptcy courts have previously adjudicated
automatic stay violations arising from first-generation smart contracts.
Such agreements do not have the same level of blockchain
sophistication, but they do have one key aspect in common—they
can, and do, enforce automatically, even after the debtor has filed a
bankruptcy petition. How bankruptcy courts have approached first-

property to the debtor: In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d at 125–26; In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at
950.
49 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 589–90.
50 Id. at 589–92.
51 See Bernard Marr, A Very Brief History of Blockchain Technology Everyone Should Read,
FORBES, (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/02/16/avery-brief-history-of-blockchain-technology-everyone-should-read/?sh=ac8ae987bc47
[https://perma.cc/U8H9-BM6C] (establishing 2008 as the date of invention for bitcoin
but predicting that “it will be intriguing to see where the next decade takes us” in terms of
blockchain technology).
52 See Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 19 (explaining that the topic of blockchain smart
contracts is currently “[w]ithout case law to guide [] analysis”). The Fulton decision came
down on January 14, 2021. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585.
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generation smart contracts may provide guidance regarding potential
second-generation adjudication, which will undoubtedly arise in the
future. However, all such cases arose prior to Fulton. Accordingly,
the opinion in Fulton is the second area of helpful law, as it directly
interprets key language in the automatic stay provisions. To the
extent that older cases interpreting first-generation smart contracts
conflict with Fulton, Fulton controls.
One of the most illustrative cases in recent bankruptcy law arose
in the Eastern District of Arkansas. As with most smart contract cases
that have made it into bankruptcy court, this litigation involved an
automated vehicle payment device.53 Called PayTeck, this device
utilized a code system to ensure the debtor’s compliance with car
payments. Each month, if the debtor made the proper car payments,
she was given a new code.54 The code needed to be entered into the
PayTeck device to stop it from disabling the vehicle’s ignition.55
Importantly, if the debtor failed to acquire and add the code on time,
the device automatically disabled the car.56 Thus, the default coding
was that the device would auto-execute a disabling command unless
the debtor affirmatively added a code on time.
It may be important to distinguish this type of first-generation
smart contract from second-generation blockchain smart contracts.
Here, human activity was still required to some extent. The creditor
needed to personally confirm that a payment had been made and
then communicate a code to the debtor each month. In return, the
debtor needed to enter the code manually. In a blockchain contract,
those types of communications would occur automatically and
independently of human discretion. Still, the PayTeck device at issue
had the power—through its coding—to disable the debtor’s vehicle
without requiring an explicit command from the creditor. That
point is what gives this case—and similar cases—useful comparative
value.
In this case, In re Hampton, after the debtor filed for bankruptcy
and the automatic stay went into effect, the debtor’s counsel timely
notified the car dealership.57 Over the ensuing weeks, a PayTeck
device routinely disabled the vehicle, leaving the debtor without
transportation.58 The court found that the car shutoffs were the
result of both the creditor providing incorrect codes from time to
53 Hampton v. Yam’s Choice Plus Autos, Inc. (In re Hampton), 319 B.R. 163, 165–66
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 165.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 168.
58 Id. at 168–70.
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time and glitches with the PayTeck device.59 In finding that the
creditor’s PayTeck device willfully violated the automatic stay, the
court took a hardline approach to creditor conduct. The court held
that when a creditor sets “in place a mechanism for exercising
control over Debtor’s property”60 it is the creditor’s responsibility to
ensure that the property is not controlled or impeded post-petition;
here, the creditor placed the burden of avoiding a shutdown on the
debtor “rather than taking action itself,”61 and thus willfully violated
the automatic stay. Critically, the court found that even if the creditor
had always provided the proper codes and always avoided glitches
with the PayTeck system, it would still potentially have violated the
automatic stay.62 Perhaps there would have been no actual damages,
but the mere ability for control via the PayTeck device would have
still been problematic.
This type of reasoning suggests an
incompatibility between the automatic stay and disabling devices,
such as the PayTeck. The creditor in Hampton never physically
repossessed the debtor’s vehicle, and the interruptions in use were
somewhat minor. Even still, the court took issue with the creditor’s
ability to interfere with the debtor’s property.
The Hampton court is not the only bankruptcy court to take issue
with a post-petition property control scheme. In a similar case arising
out of the Northern District of Ohio, the debtor also owned a vehicle
equipped with a payment protection system.63 Like the PayTeck
device at issue in Hampton, the debtor’s vehicle in In re Dawson
required periodic code inputs to avoid a shutoff. When the debtor
filed for bankruptcy, her attorney timely notified the creditor of the
case number and the legal force of the automatic stay.64 Initially, the
creditor was hostile to the debtor and indicated that the dealership
would not provide any new codes unless payments were made—
regardless of the ongoing bankruptcy.65 The creditor ultimately
backed off, but it only made half-hearted attempts to get the car

59 Id.
60 Id. at 172.
61 Id.
62 Id. (finding that “had the system worked as it should, and had Debtor called in
every month on the payment due date and obtained a valid code . . . and if Debtor had in
fact been able to use her car with no interruption . . . the Defendant may have violated the
automatic stay”).
63 Dawson v. J & B Detail, L.L.C. (In re Dawson), No. 05-22369, 2006 WL 2372821
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 2006).
64 Id. at *3.
65 Id. at *2 (establishing that the creditor pressured the debtor to “talk to her
attorney about taking the car ‘off the bankruptcy’”).
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running again.66 For instance, the creditor removed the payment
device but failed to reconnect the ignition system properly.67 When
the creditor finally resolved all the outstanding issues, the debtor’s
car had been disabled for around two months.68 It is worth noting
that the creditor’s interference in Dawson was not limited to an effort
to “exercise control” over the property under § 362(a)(3).69 That
creditor’s vindictive behavior also amounted to an act to collect a
claim against the debtor in violation of § 362(a)(6).70 This additional
legal complication may lessen somewhat Dawson’s predictive power
for smart contracts.
Still, for the bankruptcy court, the months-long interference was
sufficient to constitute a violation of the automatic stay.71 And, as
with Hampton, the court’s reasoning in Dawson has some implications
for second-generation smart contracts. The Dawson court concluded
that creditors have an affirmative responsibility to ensure that any
smart devices “would not disable” the debtor’s property “after they
had received notice of the bankruptcy filing.”72 While the court did
not demand perfect or immediate compliance with the automatic
stay, it “[did] expect those acts which violate the automatic stay to be
stopped and/or corrected within a reasonable time.”73 Thus, the
creditor’s failure to take speedy, affirmative steps to avoid additional
violation of the automatic stay was willful, and the court ordered the
creditor to pay compensatory damages.74 Accordingly, the caselaw
that has percolated through the bankruptcy system suggests a tension
between the automatic stay and mechanisms that allow creditors to
control debtor property post-petition. As the noted cases show, some
bankruptcy court decisions place the burden on the creditor to ensure
that any existing execution technology on estate property is disabled,
removed, or mitigated. When creditors fail to address such concerns,
they run the risk of willfully violating the automatic stay.
Still, it is worth noting that the mere potential for a smart
contract device to impact the debtor’s property is exceedingly
unlikely to be seen as a per se violation of the automatic stay. In In re
Grisard-Van Roey, the bankruptcy court determined that a monthly
payment monitoring device did not inherently violate the automatic
66 See id. at *3 (outlining how the creditor was slow to respond with a tow truck and
then tried to pressure debtor into paying a fee to get the car running).
67 Id. at *4, *11.
68 Id. at *3–4.
69 Id. at *7.
70 Id.
71 Id. at *8.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at *9–10.
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stay.75 While the court observed that “[the creditor] was obligated
under § 362(a)(3) to avoid exercising control over the vehicle,”76 it
had met its obligations. The device remained installed on the
debtor’s vehicle for the duration of the bankruptcy. It functioned
identically to the devices involved in In re Hampton and In re Dawson;
however, the creditor took the necessary steps to avoid contempt.
Rather than allowing the device to execute and disable the vehicle,
the creditor in In re Grisard-Van Roey made sure to send proper codes
on a consistent basis.77 Furthermore, the creditor provided the
debtor with an emergency code to allow the car to start and run for
twenty-four hours in case any technical difficulties occurred.78
Though the car did encounter some periods of being disabled, the
periods of disablement were exclusively the debtor’s fault for failing
to punch in the code on time.79 Thus, while the court in In re GrisardVan Roey ultimately determined that the creditor did not violate the
automatic stay, it still strongly stated the creditor’s duty to avoid
exercising control or obtaining possession of debtor property postpetition. The creditor involved only avoided liability through strict
diligence.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that higher courts can always
alter bankruptcy court decisions on appeal. Because the relationship
between smart contracts and the Bankruptcy Code is so novel and
untested, there has yet to be a higher court decision directly on
point.80 Therefore, while the available caselaw evinces tension
between first-generation smart contracts and the automatic stay,
much remains undecided.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SMART CONTRACTS

The caselaw involving first-generation smart contracts is
instructive to some extent, but it is also limited. Considering that all
available caselaw predates City of Chicago v. Fulton, it is unclear how
persuasive those cases remain. Additionally, second-generation
blockchain smart contracts are untested in court. Therefore, the
most helpful place to look for guidance on second-generation smart
contracts and the automatic stay is the recent City of Chicago v. Fulton

75 See Grisard-Van Roey v. Auto Credit Ctr., Inc. (In re Grisard-Van Roey), 373 B.R.
441, 444 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007).
76 Id. (emphasis added).
77 Id. at 444–45.
78 Id. at 445.
79 Id. (“Debtor failed to timely or properly enter the code.”).
80 See Rosenberg, supra note 15, at 19 (observing that there is no case law perfectly
on point for second-generation smart contracts).
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decision itself.81 Though that case did not deal directly with
blockchain contracts, it provides critical interpretive rules for the
automatic stay provisions. After Fulton, it is extremely unlikely that
second-generation smart contracts will violate the automatic stay
when they execute pre-petition. However, creditors who allow
second-generation contracts to execute post-petition do so at far
greater risk.
It is most useful to consider the likely judicial attitude toward
second-generation smart contracts in two parts. First, this Part
examines the potential for blockchain smart contracts to “exercise
control” or “obtain possession” of debtor property in both the prepetition and the post-petition contexts. Next, it analyzes whether
such actions—when wholly automated and computerized—can be
characterized as “willful.” Both inquiries converge on a single
conclusion: second-generation smart contracts that automatically
execute remedies pre-petition do not run afoul of § 362, but those
which initiate execution of remedies post-petition likely do.
A. Exercising Control or Obtaining Possession of Debtor Estate Property
1. Execution of Remedies by Second-Generation Contracts PrePetition
First, as to second-generation smart contracts that go into effect
and automatically execute remedies with respect to the debtor’s
property all before any bankruptcy petition is filed, bankruptcy courts
post-Fulton will almost certainly not find an automatic stay violation.
Bankruptcy courts are highly protective of the debtor’s estate, but the
Court’s construction of § 362 in Fulton creates space for secondgeneration contracts to operate. Before proceeding, it is necessary to
examine the Fulton case in detail.
The Fulton litigation arose out of a City of Chicago practice
regarding consequences for motor vehicle owners who failed to pay
fines and fees associated with their vehicle.82 Where a vehicle owner
failed to settle his or her debts with the city, the City would locate and
impound the car.83 It was furthermore the City’s practice to continue
holding the impounded cars in the government lot even after the
vehicle owner filed for bankruptcy.84 This policy teed up a critical
automatic stay question for the Court to determine: does a creditor’s
refusal to return debtor property constitute an exercise of control
81
82
83
84

City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021).
Id. at 589–90.
Id.
Id.
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over that property? The question essentially turned on the Court’s
construction of § 362(a)(3)’s language and whether the City had
acted “to exercise control over” the debtor’s vehicles in continuing to
impound them post-petition.
At oral argument, the Court considered competing approaches
to the “exercise control” language.85 The Petitioner argued that the
“exercise control” language was simply meant to provide postpetition protection for the debtor’s intangible property rights.86 To
clarify this point, Petitioner offered an example of a creditor
canceling a debtor’s lease agreement.87 The debtor’s lease rights
might not be “subject to possession” in the traditional sense, and
therefore might not have received automatic stay protection without
the “exercise control” language.88 Under that theory, the “exercise
control” language merely plugs a gap in the automatic stay’s postpetition coverage and was not meant to target passive creditor
conduct.
In contrast, Respondents argued that the “exercise control”
language functions as an enforcement mechanism for the § 542
turnover provisions, and mandates the return of certain estate
property when the debtor asks for it back; once a debtor requests its
property be returned, a creditor would “exercis[e] control” of estate
property by merely continuing to possess it.89 This interpretation
would allow for much broader creditor liability under the automatic
stay; a creditor could violate the automatic stay by failing to return
debtor property.90
Ultimately, the Court sided with the City of Chicago for two
main reasons. First, the Court analyzed the text of § 362(a)(3) and
determined that “[t]aken together, the most natural reading of
[§ 362(a)(3)’s terms]—‘stay,’ ‘act,’ and ‘exercise control’—is that
§ 362(a)(3) prohibits affirmative acts that would disturb the status quo
of estate property as of the time when the bankruptcy petition was
filed.”91 Accordingly, the Court’s initial impression of the statute was
that “[t]he language used in § 362(a)(3) suggests that merely
retaining possession of estate property does not violate the automatic
stay.”92 And yet the Court recognized that the text does not explicitly

85 Transcript of Oral Argument at 14–15, 47–49, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (No. 19-357).
86 Id. at 14–15.
87 Id. at 15.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 48–50. “[W]hat we have argued is that [the duty of turnover] arises when
the debtor requests the return of the property.” Id. at 48.
90 Id. at 48.
91 City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 590 (2021) (emphasis added).
92 Id.
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rule out competing interpretations.93 The Court admitted that one
could read the statute as requiring the City of Chicago to return the
impounded cars.94 However, an additional reason sealed the case for
the City.
Within the larger scheme of the Bankruptcy Code, § 542
explicitly deals with how and when a creditor must turn property
back over to the debtor.95 While § 542 contains a general turnover
command that obligates creditors to return and account for estate
property, it does contain specific rules and exceptions.96 Moreover,
the § 542 turnover provision allows for adversary proceedings under
which the debtor can request that a creditor return estate property; if
the creditor believes it has justification to continue holding the
property, it can oppose the § 542 proceeding.97 While the § 542(a)
exceptions are narrow—and would not generally apply in a typical
situation of valuable property held by a creditor—they are important
for statutory coherency.98 Per the Court, to hold that § 362(a)(3)
requires automatic property turnover would create significant tension
with § 542. Not only would it risk making § 542 superfluous, but it
would also create contradictory commands to creditors.
If
§ 362(a)(3) were read to demand affirmative creditor conduct, it
would arguably require property turnover even in contexts where a
§ 542 exception to the turnover mandate applies. The Court refused
to permit such an interpretive logjam, and instead held:
The better account of the statutory history is that the 1984
amendment, by adding the phrase regarding the exercise of
control, simply extended the stay to acts that would change the
status quo with respect to intangible property and acts that would
change the status quo with respect to tangible property without
“obtain[ing]” such property.99

The Court’s decision in Fulton and interpretation of § 362(a)(3)
strongly suggests that second-generation smart contracts will not
93 Id. (“We do not maintain that these terms definitively rule out the alternative
interpretation adopted by the court below and advocated by respondents.”).
94 Id.
95 See 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2018) (“Except as provided . . . an entity . . . shall deliver
to the trustee, and account for, such property or the value of such property, unless such
property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.”).
96 Id. § 542; see Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 591.
97 See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 594 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure treat most ‘proceeding[s] to recover . . . property’ as ‘adversary
proceedings.’” (alterations in original) (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(1))).
98 On the point of § 542(a)’s limited scope, it is worth noting that there is no
exception to turnover based on a creditor’s claim that collateral is not adequately
protected.
99 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 592 (alteration in original).
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violate the automatic stay when execution of remedies with respect to
the debtor’s property occurs pre-petition. Consider a situation in
which a second-generation smart contract is linked to a Tesla. The
contract is crafted with blockchain technology such that it has
automatic access to the debtor’s bank account and the vehicle’s
internet-connected ignition system. The debtor’s account has
insufficient funds at the time the bill is due, and the contract
immediately locks the car’s ignition. No human intervention
necessary. The vehicle owner then files for bankruptcy protection.
The car is therefore disabled before the filing of a bankruptcy
petition.
Post-Fulton, a court should find that the creditor’s use of a
second-generation smart contract in the described fashion does not
violate the automatic stay. The status quo of the vehicle at the time of
the bankruptcy petition was a locked, unusable vehicle. And as the
Court found in Fulton, the automatic stay does not mandate
affirmative creditor action to turn over debtor property.100 The
debtor might have to litigate a § 542 turnover dispute to “unlock” his
property, but that would be its own distinct—and potentially timeconsuming—proceeding apart from the automatic stay.101
2. Execution of Second-Generation Contracts Post-Petition
The analysis is different and more complicated where a secondgeneration smart contract executes remedies post-petition. Consider
the same hypothetical outlined above. However, instead of the
debtor defaulting on his sedan payments before filing a bankruptcy
petition with the immediate, automatic execution of remedies by the
smart contract, he defaults and triggers execution of remedies by the
smart contract after the automatic stay is already in effect. In that
instance, there could potentially be a finding that the secondgeneration contract executing and locking the car’s ignition
constitutes an impermissible change to the status quo of tangible
property. After all, the car became disabled after the debtor filed for
bankruptcy protection. That post-petition execution by the smart
contract will likely be found to violate the automatic stay.

100 Id. at 591–92 (describing that reading § 362 to involve an “affirmative turnover
obligation” would be a significant modification to the statutory language and refusing to
do so).
101 Id. at 594 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Although the Court today holds that
§ 362(a)(3) does not require creditors to turn over impounded vehicles, bankruptcy
courts are not powerless to facilitate the return of debtors’ vehicles to their owners. Most
obviously, the Court leaves open the possibility of relief under § 542(a).”).
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A court addressing this question will first have to determine
whether the automatic implementation of a remedy upon default by
a smart contract constitutes an “act” within the meaning of § 362. In
its relevant part, § 362(a)(3) prohibits “any act . . . to exercise control
over property” of the bankruptcy estate.102 An essential component
of that language is that there must be a cognizable creditor “act.”
The execution of a remedy by a second-generation smart contract
happens immediately upon the occurrence of certain conditions and
takes place irrespective of any post-petition human behavior.103
Accordingly, a creditor can be expected to argue that the mere
execution of a blockchain sequence without any action of the
creditor post-petition does not satisfy the act requirement.
The creditor could also be expected to argue that available
caselaw involving first-generation smart contracts are distinguishable.
For instance, the cases In re Hampton and In re Dawson both featured
automatic stay violations for first-generation smart contracts, and
both of those cases also featured explicit creditor actions postpetition.104 But because the ignition limiting systems in those vehicles
were not fully automatic, the creditors had to continually—and
manually—provide debtors with codes post-petition even though the
default and initiation of control of the vehicle occurred pre-petition.
In a case involving a second-generation smart contract, there would
be no additional human conduct whatsoever following the filing of
the bankruptcy petition. The code in the contract would function
independently and autonomously, which arguably could rule out any
sort of cognizable “act” within the meaning of § 362.
However, several persuasive counterpoints suggest that a stay
violation is the likely outcome when a smart contract executes
remedies post-petition. First, the text of Fulton strongly emphasizes
the role that the status quo plays in § 362 violations. When a smart
contract executes remedies post-petition, it almost undoubtedly
changes the status quo of the debtor’s estate. Second, the problem
with identifying a cognizable act is not impossible to overcome. For
instance, courts can look back to the initial creation of the contract to
identify a cognizable act. Accordingly, the parties’ original crafting of
the smart contract probably constitutes an “act” within the meaning

102 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2018).
103 See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
104 Dawson v. J & B Detail, L.L.C. (In re Dawson), No. 05-22369, 2006 WL 2372821, at
*1, *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 2006) (describing the starter device and confirming
that an employee needed to identify and send proper codes); Hampton v. Yam’s Choice
Plus Autos, Inc. (In re Hampton), 319 B.R. 163, 165–66, 172 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005)
(indicating the same).
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of § 362.105 Moreover, a court could reasonably find that the computer is an “agent” of the creditor. Statutory law supports this
interpretation and would allow the court to impute the computer’s
“actions” to its principals. Each point is analyzed below.
First, a second-generation smart contract executing post-petition
likely impermissibly alters the status quo of the debtor estate. In the
Fulton opinion, the Court repeatedly emphasizes the importance of
the “status quo.” For example, the Court states that “[t]aken
together, the most natural reading of [the § 362(a)(3) language] . . .
is that § 362(a)(3) prohibits affirmative acts that would disturb the
status quo of estate property as of the time when the bankruptcy petition
was filed.”106 This quote therefore drives at the center of the smart
contract question. If a second-generation smart contract executes
post-petition—for example, to lock-up a debtor’s equipment or
vehicle—it would likely “disturb” the post-petition status quo. Under
the language of Fulton, this would seem to be a violation of the stay.
Next, there are a few avenues by which the “act” problem might
be overcome. While no human actor would technically execute the
smart contract post-petition, the parties did create the contract and
endow it with the ability to automatically execute. A court could
therefore reasonably determine that the creditor acted within the
meaning of § 362(a)(3) when it set in motion a digital machine
capable of executing post-petition. A smart contract’s behavior is
inherently foreseeable, and courts could hold creditors responsible
for their role in crafting such automated digital machines. Moreover,
recent additions to agency law suggest that computers can count as
“agents” of their creators. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act,
which is in effect in virtually all states, contains a definition of an
electronic agent: “‘Electronic agent’ means a computer program or
an electronic or other automated means used independently to
initiate an action or respond to electronic records or performances in
whole or in part, without review or action by an individual.”107 The
comment to that provision continues, explaining that “[a]s a general
rule, the employer of a tool is responsible for the results obtained by
the use of that tool . . . .”108 Therefore, courts could look to modern
105 Courts have “looked back” to find cognizable acts in other legal contexts. For
instance, a homeowner who crafted a “trap gun” was found criminally liable when the
machine he built killed a burglar. See State v. Plumlee, 149 So. 425 (La. 1933). This
colorful example indicates that legal acts can have consequences across time.
106 Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 590 (emphasis added).
107 UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2(6) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE
LS. 1999); see also Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7001–7006, 7021, 7031 (2018) (establishing nationally that nearly all electronic
contracts and signatures are binding and permissible).
108 UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2(6) cmt. to “Electronic agent.”
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agency rules to identify the post-petition execution of a smart
contract to identify a cognizable § 362 “act.” Either way, the totality
of the arguments tip in favor of a stay violation.
B. The Question of Willfulness
The inquiry into automatic stay violation also requires a
willfulness determination if damages are to be imposed upon a
creditor violating the stay.109 Accordingly, even if a court finds a
blockchain contract to violate the stay, there could still be a basis for
not finding such a violation to be willful, thus precluding the
imposition of damages upon the creditor. Such a creditor would still
have to remedy the § 362(a)(3) violation but would not be subject to
additional monetary penalties.110 In the context of first-generation
smart contracts, courts have often occasionally found the willfulness
prong to be satisfied when the creditor fails to avoid an impending
violation of the automatic stay. For example, in the case of In re
Hampton, the court held that the creditor’s “failure to take the
necessary action, such as removing the device or ensuring that
Debtor always had a correct code” constituted willfulness.111
Similarly, the In re Dawson court cited approvingly to In re Hampton
and restated that a creditor’s “failure to take the necessary affirmative
steps required to avoid violating the automatic stay can only be
described as ‘willful.’”112
One additional case is also worth discussing. In In re O’Neal, the
debtors entered into a pre-petition agreement with a creditor for
automatic monthly wire transfers.113 The transfers were automatically
drafted out of debtors’ depository bank and were paid directly to the
creditor’s account at a predetermined date each month.114 When the
debtors sought bankruptcy protection in June, they promptly notified
the recipient creditor.115 Still, the creditor failed to turn off the autodraft feature, and its system continued to transfer money from the

109 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2018).
110 Id. § 362(k)(2) (establishing that a good faith violator of the automatic stay shall
be liable only for actual damages and not punitive damages).
111 Hampton v. Yam’s Choice Plus Autos, Inc. (In re Hampton), 319 B.R. 163, 171
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005).
112 Dawson v. J & B Detail, L.L.C. (In re Dawson), No. 05-22369, 2006 WL 2372821, at
*9 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 2006).
113 See O’Neal v. Beneficial of Tenn. Inc. (In re O’Neal), 165 B.R. 859, 861 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1994).
114 Id.
115 Id.
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debtors’ account in July.116 The debtors had insufficient funds to
meet the obligation, leading to hundreds of dollars in overdraft fees
and the like.117 In ruling against the creditor, the court emphasized
that a creditor willfully violates § 362(a)(3) when it receives
automatic payments after filing because doing so amounts to
“dispossessing the debtors of their checking account deposits.”118
The same principle has been applied in other contexts as well,
including post-petition garnishment of a debtor’s wages.119
Accordingly, once creditors have notice of a petition, bankruptcy
courts do sometimes expect creditors to stop any impending acts of
control or repossession.120 While much remains undecided within
the applicable law, the question of willfulness thus likely rises and
falls with a court’s framework of analysis. Whether a court is likely to
find that a monetary penalty should be imposed under § 362(k)(1)
after a finding of a stay violation under § 362(a)(3) may well depend
on whether the court decides to scrutinize a creditor’s pre-petition
action. If the court—in determining willfulness—is inclined to
consider the creditor’s pre-petition actions in structuring the
blockchain in a way that permits automatic execution of remedies
without regard to the borrower’s bankruptcy filing, it will likely find
the violation to be willful.
C. Foreseeable Consequences and Threats to Debtors
Considering the predictions outlined in this Note, debtors may
face serious challenges in the coming years at the hands of secondgeneration smart contracts. As blockchain technology continues to
grow in prevalence, creditors can make use of second-generation
contracts to impact debtor property in ways that were previously
impossible. Although much of this Note was focused on analyzing
116 Id. (noting that the creditor’s attempt to auto-draft payment resulted in the
debtor incurring $647.00 in vendor penalties).
117 Id.
118 Id. at 862 (“Consequently, the court finds that [creditor] has violated the
automatic stay imposed by the debtors’ Chapter 13 filing under § 362(a)(3) . . . .”).
119 Id. at 862; see also Chi. Painters’ and Decorators’ Pension, Health and Welfare and
Deferred Sav. Plan Tr. Funds v. Cunha, 121 B.R. 232, 233 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Elder v. City of
Thomasville (In re Elder), 12 B.R. 491, 496 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981).
120 See Hampton v. Yam’s Choice Plus Autos, Inc. (In re Hampton), 319 B.R. 163, 172
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2005) (“[F]ailure to take appropriate action to avoid violating the
automatic stay leads the Court to find that Defendant willfully exercised control . . . .”); see
also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Roberts (In re Roberts), 175 B.R. 339, 343–44 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1994) (refusing to entertain a creditor’s excuse that its violation of the automatic stay was
inadvertent because its computer system “[was] not programmed to observe the
automatic stay” and finding that “return[ing] the payments to the debtors with interest”
did not foreclose other types of liability, such as fees and costs).
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the likely consequences of second-generation contracts for personal
vehicles, smart technology can one day apply to much larger swaths
of the economy. For instance, creditors already deploy smart
contracts to control factory equipment, corporate vehicles, or other
critical machinery; moreover, smart contracts increasingly impact sale
and purchasing agreements.121 And, after Fulton, the automatic stay
almost certainly will not require creditors to affirmatively reactivate
property disabled pre-petition. The potential disruption to debtors—
whether individuals or businesses—could be significant.
There is a remedy for debtors whose property has been disabled
by smart contracts, but it is unduly cumbersome. Under § 542, the
Bankruptcy Code provides an avenue through which debtors can
force creditors to return or re-enable estate property. Yet this provision is extremely slow and costly in practice. Turnover to debtors in
possession requires an adversary proceeding,122 and debtors must
endure time and money expenses to force a creditor to return
control of property to the debtor. For example, as noted in Justice
Sotomayor’s Fulton concurrence, the turnover provision provides
ineffective relief to bankrupt individuals who need their cars to get to
work.123 The same basic issue will soon present itself on a broader
scale as second-generation smart contracts develop. Creditors will be
able to maintain passive possession of debtor property or disable
debtor property until a § 542 adversary proceeding is prosecuted to a
successful completion by the debtor. In the meantime, the debtor’s
business or personal finances will suffer.
The best way to remedy this situation is to bypass the gridlock of
Congress and focus on amending the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure. Right now, Rule 7001(1) requires that most turnover
actions take place by adversary proceeding.124 This should be modified to allow a turnover proceeding to occur via simple motion of the
debtor where certain criteria are met. One option would be to allow
turnover via motion where the property sought is tangible and easily
obtainable. An automobile would be a perfect candidate for such a
rule change. Another avenue could be to allow a debtor to file a
motion for turnover where the property would be “essential” to the
121 See John Ream, Yang Chu & David Schatsky, Upgrading Blockchains: Smart Contract
Use Cases in Industry, DELOITTE INSIGHTS (June 9, 2016), https://www2.deloitte.com/us
/en/insights/focus/signals-for-strategists/using-blockchain-for-smart-contracts.html
[https://perma.cc/E26L-2Q2U].
122 FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 7001(1).
123 City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 593–94 (2021) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
124 See FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 7001(1) (establishing that the recovery of money or
property must take place via adversary proceeding, unless the debtor is being compelled
to deliver property to the trustee).
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debtor’s rehabilitation efforts. Again, a wage-earner’s vehicle or a
factory’s critical machinery would fall into such a categorical carveout. Either modification would immediately further the policies of
bankruptcy, and would save debtor estates from needless litigation
costs.
CONCLUSION
At bottom, second-generation smart contracts present a new and
generally untested area of law, especially with respect to bankruptcy
proceedings and the automatic stay. Still, the decisions to date give
rise to dual conclusions. When second-generation smart contracts
execute pre-petition, the Fulton opinion likely sets them beyond the
reach of § 362. However, blockchain contracts which execute postpetition are not likely to be so fortunate. These conclusions lead to
unfortunate consequences for bankruptcy debtors, especially in the
pre-petition context. As creditors gain the ability to disable debtor
property using sophisticated electronic means, debtors may be forced
to put their livelihoods and businesses on hold while they litigate
turnover proceedings. Already a problem, such difficult circumstances will become more widespread as second-generation smart
contracts gain favor with creditors. The problem demands a solution,
especially with respect to creating expedited procedures for
reactivating disabled property. The purpose of bankruptcy law is to
ensure that individuals and businesses have an option for a fresh
financial start. But that purpose is only fulfilled when the Bankruptcy
Code’s procedures deliver timely and effective relief to debtors. If
the bankruptcy system is to continue providing successful outcomes
as technology expands, prompt amendments to the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure are required.

